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RECENT LEGISLATION 
CREmToRs' RIGHTS-PHYSICIANS' LmNs ON PATmNTs' ToRT CLAIMS-A 
recent Illinois statute creates a lien in favor of licensed physicians for their 
reasonable charges for treating persons injured by the negligent or wrongful 
act of another. The lien attaches to all claims or causes of action of the 
injured person against the person causing the injury, whether settled by 
litigation or by settlement. The maximum amount recoverable under the 
lien is one-third of the sum paid or due to the injured party, and the lien 
is expressly made to survive his death. The physician must serve notice of 
his assertion of the lien on both the injured party and the person liable for 
the injury. On ten-days' written notice, any party to the action may have 
access to the physician's records concerning his treatment of the injured 
party. The lien is made inferior to attorneys' liens, does not apply at all in 
workmen's compensation cases, and may be enforced in the courts of the 
state. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 82, §§101.1-101.6.1 
Although doctors are similar to lawyers in that the peculiar nature of 
their profession often requires them to render services regardless of their 
client's inability to pay, the common law never favored the medical profes-
sion with the sort of protection afforded attorneys in their judgment lien.2 
The claims of the medical profession for services rendered remained almost 
completely unsecured until the 1930's. When legislative aid came in that 
decade - perhaps in large part due to a combination of widespread :financial 
irresponsibility and rising automobile injuries - it came primarily in favor 
of hospitals rather than private practitioners. This trend has continued 
until the present time.s As a result, while the District of Columbia and 
thirty of the fifty states now have lien legislation in favor of hospitals,4 only 
nine of these extend the acts to include physicians.5 Although naturally 
1 Charity hospitals in Illinois have been accorded an almost identical lien since 1939. 
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 82, §§97-101. 
2 Albee v. King, 17 N.J. Misc. 180, 7 A. (2d) 291 (1939). 
3 In 1930 only one state (Nebraska) had such legislation; by 1940 twenty jurisdictions 
had passed lien acts; by 1950 the number had risen to 24; at present the number stands 
at 31 (including the District of Columbia). The acts of Alaska and Massachusetts were first 
passed in 1959. 
4 Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. 
An interesting possible explanation for the absence of similar legislation in Pennsylvania 
is the fact that an act giving attorneys in that state a judgment lien was declared uncon-
stitutional as special legislation in Laplacca v. Philadelphia Rapid Transit Co., 68 Pa. 
Super. 208 (1917), affd. 265 Pa. 304, 108 A. 612 (1919). See note, 68 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 277 
(1920). 
5 Arkansas, Hawaii, Illinois, Montana, Nebraska, New Jersey, North Carolina, Virginia, 
and Washington. A proposal to extend the benefits of the New York Hospital Lien Act [32 
N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1940; Supp. 1959) §189] to physicians was defeated in the 
New York legislature on March 29, 1949. See 1949 N.Y. Legis. Index, Senate Intro. No. 
2045, Senate Print No. 2253. Nurses are given a lien in the statutes of Alaska, Arkansas, 
Montana, Nebraska, North Carolina, Virginia, and Washington. Dentists are included in 
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differing as to detailed provisions, the statutes are remarkably similar in 
their basic approach and most important provisions. The judicial gloss 
which they have acquired in the past thirty years may therefore profitably be 
referred to in appraising the newest Illinois version. The right of action 
created by these statutes in favor of the lienholder is clearly not against the 
injured patient, but rather against the person (or corporation) causing the 
injuries.6 In some ways it is analogous to the remedy provided by garnish-
ment laws,7 or to an assignment by the injured party to the lienholder of 
at least a portion of his cause of action,8 or to a subrogation of the lien-
holder to the right of action against the tortfeasor.9 Actually, of course, it 
is none of these; rather, like other statutory liens, it is a completely new 
remedy created where none existed before. Courts have differed widely 
concerning the type of construction which this sort of legislation should 
receive. Some say the statutes are remedial and therefore to be liberally 
construed.1° Others regard the acts as in derogation of the common law 
and therefore to be strictly interpreted.11 It would seem that this split of 
authority reflects more properly a difference in judicial attitudes toward 
the broadening of creditors' remedies than differing concepts of the actual 
nature of the rights created. In any case, these differing reactions may be 
either explicitly or implicitly at the root of a particular court's decision on 
such questions as whether the statute is to operate retroactively,12 how 
strictly the statutory requirements as to notice must be followed in order to 
perfect the lien,13 or whether the lien will attach when the injured party 
the acts of Hawaii, New Jersey, and North Carolina. The lien in Connecticut (which 
attaches only to proceeds of the tortfeasor's insurance) extends to ambulance operators. 
A statute giving a lien to hospitals does not impliedly include the physicians employed by 
the hospital. Glazer v. Department of Hospitals of New York City, 2 Misc. (2d) 207, 155 
N.Y.S. (2d) 414 (1956). 
6 Buchanan v. Beirne Lumber Co., 197 Ark. 635, 124 S.W. (2d) 813 (1939); Hospital 
Authority of City of Augusta v. Boyd, 96 Ga. App. 705, 101 S.E. (2d) 207 (1957). 
7 Hospital Authority of City of Augusta v. Boyd, note 6 supra. 
s Albee v. King, note 2 supra. At common law rights of action for personal injury 
were not assignable. See the interesting discussions in Richard v. National Transport Co., 
158 Misc. 324, 285 N.Y.S. 870 (1936), and Glazer v. Department of Hospitals of New York 
City, note 5 supra. 
9 La. Rev. Stat. (1950) §§46.8-46.15, instead of giving a lien, provides that the state's 
charity hospitals will be subrogated to their patients' tort claims. 
10 Buchanan v. Beirne Lumber Co., note 6 supra; Groth v. City of New York, 183 
Misc. 1026, 54 N.Y.S. (2d) 534 (1944), app. dismissed 75 N.Y.S. (2d) 523 (1947). 
11 Ellington v. Bradford, 242 N.C. 159, 86 S.E. (2d) 925 (1955); Layton v. Home Indem-
nity Co., 9 Wash. (2d) 25, 113 P. (2d) 538 (1941). 
12 Holding statute to operate prospectively only: Heights Hospital, Inc. v. Patterson, 
(Tex. 1954) 269 S.W. (2d) 810; Layton v. Home Indemnity Co., note 11 supra. 
13 Compare Layton v. Home Indemnity Co., note 11 supra, and Groth v. City of New 
York, note 10 supra (lien allowed despite failure strictly to comply with notice provisions), 
with Livingston v. Zimmerman, 5 App. Div. (2d) 812, 170 N.Y.S. (2d) 103 (1958), and 
Melichar v. Michelson, 256 App. Div. 962, 9 N.Y.S. (2d) 1016 (1939), app. dismissed 281 
N.Y. 665, 22 N.E. (2d) 488 (1939), motion granted, 281 N.Y. 671, 22 N.E. (2d) 868 (1939) 
(lien denied because of failure to comply with notice provisions). 
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is an indigent,14 a married woman,111 or a minor.1s Since there appears to 
have been as yet no judicial construction of the Illinois hospital lien actl 'l 
or of its new counterpart in favor of physicians, it cannot be stated with 
assurance whether the Illinois courts will choose the strict or the liberal 
approach to the statutes. Perhaps a strict construction is more probable, 
however, in view of a long line of Illinois decisions inte:rpreting the Illinois 
attorneys' lien act1S strictly, as being in derogation of the common law.10 
Such a construction would be unfortunate when applied to creditors' reme-
dies in favor of the medical profession, in view of the special degree of public 
benefit involved in its services and the obligation imposed by its code of 
ethics never to refuse treatment because of the patient's inability to pay. 
That statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed 
is not, after all, a maxim of inevitable application.20 It is rather, like other 
canons of statutory construction, a rule of thumb expressing the probable 
intent of the legislature in the absence of other evidence to the contrary. 
It is to be hoped that when they consider the hospital and physicians' lien 
statutes, the Illinois courts will not immediately invoke strict construction 
merely by analogy to the attorneys' lien laws, without first considering 
whether there is not persuasive evidence that in the case of the medical 
profession a more liberal approach was intended by the legislature. 
Clayton R. Smalley 
14 Gamer v. City of Houston, (Tex. 1959) 323 S.W. (2d) 659 (lien did not apply). 
15 Dawson v. Hospital Authority of Augusta, 98 Ga. App. 792, 106 S.E. (2d) 807 (1958) 
(lien applied). 
16 Compare Abbondola v. Kawecki, 177 Misc. 122, 29 N.Y.S. (2d) 530 (1941) (lien did 
not apply), with Ferguson v. Ruppert, 166 Misc. 530, 3 N.Y.S. (2d) 9 (1938) (lien applied). 
N.C. Gen. Stat. (1950; Supp. 1959) §44-49 provides: " .•. Where damages are recovered for 
and in behalf of minors or persons non compos mentis, such liens shall attach to the sum 
recovered as fully and effectively as if said person were sui juris." See Ellington v. Brad-
ford, note 11 supra. 
l'l Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 82, §§97-101. 
18 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 13, §14. 
19 Mason v. Papadopulos, 12 Ill. App. (2d) 140, 138 N.E. (2d) 821 (1956); De Parcq v. 
Gardner, 336 Ill. App. 144, 83 N.E. (2d) 32 (1948); Cazalet v. Cazalet, 322 Ill. App. 105, 54 
N.E. (2d) 61 (1944); Coyle v. Velie Motors Corp., 305 Ill. App. 135, 27 N.E. (2d) 60 (1940); 
Mayer v. Yellow Cab. Co., 247 Ill. App. 42 (1927). 
20 The canon may be, and often is, made expressly inapplicable to particular statutes. 
E.g., Ill. Rev. Stat. (1959) c. 106½, §4(1) (Uniform Partnership Act). 
